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Published in:

Anthropology in the New Testament and Its Ancient Context: Papers from the EABS-Meeting in Piliscsaba/Budapest

IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from it. Please check the document version below.

Document Version

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Publication date:

2010

[Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

van Kooten, G. H. (2010). The Anthropological Trichotomy of Spirit, Soul and Body in Philo of Alexandria and Paul of Tarsus. In Labahn/ Michael, & Lehtipuu/Outi (Eds.), *Anthropology in the New Testament and Its Ancient Context: Papers from the EABS-Meeting in Piliscsaba/Budapest* (pp. 87 - 119). (Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology; No. 54). Peeters.

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THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL TRICHOTOMY OF SPIRIT, SOUL AND BODY IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA AND PAUL OF TARSUS¹

1. Introduction

Today probably the best known expression of philosophical anthropology in antiquity is Plato's differentiation between body and soul.² It is perhaps less well-known that already in Plato the features of a tripartite anthropology shine through alongside this dichotomic anthropology. What is virtually unknown, however, is that by the first century CE this tripartite anthropology, which distinguishes between mind, soul and body, was being received and reworked by Jewish and Jewish-Christian authors such as Philo of Alexandria (fl. CE 40), Paul of Tarsus (fl. CE 50) and Flavius Josephus (fl. CE 75-95). Especially for Philo and Paul, this type of anthropology, reshaped by their Jewish interpretation, strongly coloured their understanding of humankind.

The differentiation of soul into soul and mind already takes place, if only incipiently, in Plato. In several passages Plato points out that mind (νοῦς) is a quality of the soul (ψυχή): mind is one of the good aspects of the soul, together with other virtues such as courage (ἀνδρεία) and self-restraint (σωφροσύνη) (*Philebus* 55B).³ In Plato's *Phaedrus*, the

¹ This paper is an abridged version of a fuller paper which appears in C. JEDAN – L. JANSEN (eds.), *Philosophische Anthropologie in der Antike* (Themen der Antiken Philosophie / Topics in Ancient Philosophy), Frankfurt et al., Ontos Verlag, *forthcoming*, and has been incorporated in G.H. VAN KOOTEN, *Paul's Anthropology in Context. The Image of God, Assimilation to God, and Tripartite Man in Ancient Judaism, Ancient Philosophy and Early Christianity* (WUNT, 232), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2008, chap. 5, pp. 269-312. The paper profited greatly from discussion in the Paul seminar of the 2006 British New Testament Conference at Sheffield. I wish to thank especially Dr Edward Adams (London), Prof. John Barclay (Durham) and Prof. Francis Watson (Aberdeen, now Durham) for their criticisms, comments and suggestions. I am grateful to Dr Maria Sherwood-Smith for revising the English of this paper.

² On the soul-body dichotomy in Plato, see, e.g., T.M. ROBINSON, *The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato*, in J.P. WRIGHT – P. POTTER (eds.), *Psyche and Soma. Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, chap. 2, pp. 37-55.

³ For mind as a quality of the soul, see further *Laws*, XII 961D, 967B.

mind even rises to prominence within the soul, since it is called “the pilot of the soul”, the ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης (*Phaedrus* 247C).⁴

In a cosmological context, Plato remarks that the “by no means feeble cause which orders and arranges years and seasons and months” is justly called “mind” (*nous*) and that this mind could never come into being without soul (*psychē*):⁵ “in the nature of Zeus you would say that a kingly soul (*psychē*) and a kingly mind (*nous*) were implanted (...). It confirms the utterances of those who declared of old that mind (*nous*) always rules the universe” (*Philebus* 30C-D). In the *Cratylus*, these utterances are attributed to Anaxagoras: “Do you not believe the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that it is mind (*nous*) and soul (*psychē*) which orders and holds the nature of all things?” (*Cratylus* 400A). According to Plato, it is the cosmic soul, “in conjunction with mind”, which “runs aright and always governs all things rightly and happily” (*Laws*, X 896D-897B). In his *Timaeus*, Plato clearly locates this cosmic mind within the cosmic soul, which is again constructed within the body of the cosmos: “mind cannot possibly belong to any apart from soul. So because of this reflection He [i.e. the Demiurge] constructed mind within soul and soul within body as He fashioned the All. (...) This cosmos has verily come into existence as a living creature endowed with soul and mind” (*Timaeus* 30BC).

Implicitly, then, Plato states here that a living human being also consists of mind, soul and body. The dominance of the mind within this tripartite anthropology is confirmed by the above passage from the *Phaedrus*, where Plato explicitly calls it “the pilot of the soul”. In this way, already in Plato the outline of a tripartite anthropology begins to emerge.⁶ The aim of this paper is to show how this trichotomy was adopted by Philo of Alexandria (section 2) and Paul of Tarsus (section 3), Jews living in the first century CE, and how they reworked it on the basis of the Jewish Scriptures.

In Paul, these anthropological views on the constitution of humankind are unfolded in a notoriously difficult chapter of his First Letter to the Corinthians, the well-known passage on the nature of the post-resurrection

⁴ All translations of classical authors are taken from the Loeb Classical Library, sometimes with minor modifications; the English translation of the New Testament is normally taken from the *Revised English Bible*.

⁵ Cf. *Timaeus* 46C: “the one and only existing thing which has the property of acquiring *nous* is Soul”.

⁶ Scholars have pointed out that this incipient trichotomic anthropology is boosted by Aristotle who clearly distinguished between mind and soul. See, e.g., J. DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect*, in A. PÉREZ JIMÉNEZ – F. CASADÉSUS (eds.), *Estudios sobre Plutarco. Misticismo y Religiones Místicas en la Obra de Plutarco*, Madrid-Málaga, Ediciones Clásicas & Charta Antiqua, 2001, pp. 35-44, esp. 36-37.

body (1 Cor 15). Paul had briefly expressed his view on humankind's trichotomous constitution prior to that, as we shall see (in 1 Thess 5,23), but it is in 1 Cor 15 that he has reason to expound his views on the issue and it is here that we can grasp the full range of his thought. In this chapter, Paul gives us an insight into his anthropological views by distinguishing between "the first human being" (ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος), Adam, and "the second human being" (ὁ δεύτερος ἄνθρωπος), Christ.

Following a quotation from the narrative about the creation of humankind in Gen 2,7 LXX, which tells of God blowing into man's face a breath of life by which man "became a living soul" (καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τοῦ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), the "first human being" is identified as "soul" (ψυχὴ) and, for that reason, is regarded as belonging to the sphere of "that which is psychic" (τὸ ψυχικόν). The "second human being", however, is identified as "spirit" (πνεῦμα) and belongs to "that which is pneumatic" (τὸ πνευματικόν). The first human being, moreover, is characterized as "earthly" (χοϊκός), whereas the second human being is depicted as "from heaven" (ἐξ οὐρανοῦ) and "heavenly" (ἐπουράνιος). The first human being has a "psychic body" (σῶμα ψυχικόν), whereas the second human being possesses a "pneumatic body" (σῶμα πνευματικόν). Their bodily status seems to differ in accordance with their characterization as "psychic" and "pneumatic" respectively. Until now, according to Paul, we have worn the image of the earthly human being, and only after the resurrection we shall (fully) wear the image of the heavenly human being – καὶ καθὼς ἐφορέσαμεν τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ χοϊκοῦ, φορέσομεν καὶ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου (1 Cor 15,44-49). It is important to note that here, too, Paul alludes to the creation narrative, this time not to Gen 2,7 but to Gen 1,26-27 which speaks about the image (εἰκόν) in which humankind was created. Although Paul's prime concern in this section on the resurrection is the bodily status of human beings before and after the resurrection, his full anthropological views can easily be discerned, although they remain difficult to understand in the absence of analogies.

There is general consensus in current scholarship that the earthly, "psychic" and the heavenly, "pneumatic" pair distinguished in 1 Cor 15 does not derive from proto-Gnosticism.⁷ Considerable debate continues,

⁷ For a profound criticism of a gnosticizing interpretation of Philo's notion of the heavenly human being, see A.J.M. WEDDERBURN, *Philo's "Heavenly Man"*, in *NT* 15 (1973) 301-326, esp. 301, 310-311, 323-326.

however, about the relevance of Philo's differentiation between the two types of human beings, a heavenly and an earthly human being, for a proper understanding of 1 Cor 15. Most of those who do regard Philo's writings as relevant for discerning the meaning of 1 Cor 15 construe a *difference* between Paul and Philo, assuming that Paul is in fact arguing *against* a Corinthian version of the two types of man anthropology also known from Philo.⁸ On this understanding, Paul's Corinthian opponents are "Philonic". This argument is based on the fact that Paul seems to deliberately invert Philo's sequence of the first, pneumatic-heavenly human being and the second, psychic-earthly human being: "Observe, the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic" – ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15,46). This line is read as an expression of Pauline polemic against a Philonic, ontological priority of the ideal, heavenly human being over the earthly human being – a priority which, it is believed, is deliberately reversed by Paul. The ontological priority is turned into a chronological order in which the earthly human being comes first and is followed, eschatologically, by the heavenly human being, who comes last.⁹

In this article I wish to show, however, that Philo and Paul do not differ in their understanding of the heavenly and earthly human being, but both adopt the same tripartite anthropology which distinguishes between body, *psychē* and *pneuma*. Philo, too, is of the opinion that human beings are subject to degeneration and that, for this reason, the psychic human being should be restored to his original ideal, the heavenly human being. This necessary transition from psychic to pneumatic man is fundamentally identical to that in Paul. Both thinkers develop a soteriological tripartite anthropology which aims at humankind's re-spiritualization. We shall first look in detail at Philo's view on *the relation between the heavenly and earthly human being at Creation*, as expressed in his exegesis of the creation narrative of Gen 1–2 (section 2.1). Subsequently, we shall focus on Philo's thoughts about *the degeneration of humankind*

⁸ For an extensive bibliography on those "who argue that the Corinthians with whom Paul argues are significantly guided by a Philonic type of thinking", see D.M. HAY, *Philo's Anthropology*, in R. DEINES – K.W. NIEBUHR (eds.), *Philo und das Neue Testament. Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen – Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum, 1.–4. Mai 2004, Eisenach/Jena* (WUNT, 172), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2004, pp. 127–142, esp. 127 n. 1.

⁹ Cf. a similar critical reconstruction of these common views in B. SCHALLER, *Adam und Christus bei Paulus*, in DEINES – NIEBUHR, *Philo und das Neue Testament* (n. 8), pp. 143–153, esp. 149–151.

(section 2.2), to be followed by his views on *the restoration of human beings* (section 2.3). Finally, we shall compare Philo's view of the two types of human beings with that of Paul (section 3).

2. Philo of Alexandria

2.1. *The Relation between the Heavenly and Earthly Human Being at Creation*

(a) Double Creation – Gen 1 and 2

Before we look at Philo's interpretation of the creation of humankind, and at his detailed views on the anthropological constitution of humankind, it is important to examine the general framework of Philo's understanding of creation in Gen 1–2. In Paul we have already encountered two important anthropological passages from Gen 1 and 2 respectively. According to Gen 1,26-27 LXX, humankind was created "in the image of God" (1 Cor 15,49); Gen 2,7 LXX tells how "God formed man by taking clay from the earth, and breathed into his face the breath (*πνοή*) of life, so that he became a living soul" (1 Cor 15,45).

The same key passages from Gen 1–2 are constitutive for Philo's anthropology. The creation of humankind in Gen 1 is taken as the creation of the *heavenly human being*, whereas Gen 2 is understood as an account of the creation of the *earthly human being*. In Philo's Platonizing interpretation, the creation in Gen 1 is about the creation of the *invisible*, ideal, "archetypical" human being, whose *visible* creation is then narrated in Gen 2 – a double creation. Gen 1, in Philo's view, still concerns the design phase, the creation of models, as he says explicitly:

He [God] conceived beforehand *the models* of its parts, and (...) out of these He constituted and brought to completion *a world discernible only by the mind*, and then, with that for a pattern, the world which our senses can perceive (*On the Creation* 19).¹⁰

The remark at the beginning of Gen 2, "Thus the heavens and the earth and everything in them were completed" (Gen 2,1), is understood as a remark about the completion of the ideal, paradigmatic world, on the pattern of which the visible world was created (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,1).

¹⁰ For a running commentary on Philo's *On the Creation*, see D.T. RUNIA, *On the Creation of the Cosmos According to Moses / Philo of Alexandria. Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series, 1), Leiden, Brill, 2001.

Philo's reading of Gen 1 and 2 is not entirely the product of his own Platonizing interpretation. The LXX text of Gen 1,1-2 already speaks of the earth as "invisible", ἀόρατος, thus suggesting a Platonic interpretation of the first creation account of Gen 1 in terms of the creation of a paradigmatic, true reality, to be followed by the creation of a visible reality, narrated in Gen 2.¹¹

(b) The Heavenly Human Being – Gen 1,26-27

It is within this framework that Philo understands the creation of the heavenly and the earthly human being. According to Philo, the creation of the former is the subject of Gen 1,26-27, which speaks of God's deliberations to "make human beings in our image, after our likeness": ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν. Philo comments on this phrase as follows:

After all the rest (...), man was created after the image of God and after His likeness (Gen 1,26). (...) nothing earth-born is more like God than man. Let no one represent the likeness as one to a bodily form (...). No, it is in respect of the Mind, the sovereign element of the soul, that the word image is used; for after the pattern of a single Mind (...) the mind in each of those who successively came into being was moulded (*On the Creation* 69).

Philo explains that the common denominator between humankind and God, which establishes the likeness between them, is the mind (*nous*), which he calls "the sovereign element of the soul". The underlying view is that humans consist of three parts – body, soul, and mind, as becomes clear from the following comparison:

For indeed the wise man is the first of the human race, as a pilot in a ship or a ruler in a city or a general in war, or again as a soul in a body and a mind in a soul (καὶ ψυχὴ μὲν ἐν σώματι, νοῦς δ' ἐν ψυχῇ), or, once again, as heaven in the world or God in heaven (*On Abraham* 272).

The basic distinction is that between body and soul, but within the soul the dominating principle is that of the mind, which rules the lower, irrational soul, made up of the senses:

¹¹ This is how Gen 1–2 was interpreted by Philo and Clement, but also by John the Evangelist, as his terminology of "the true light" indicates. See G.H. VAN KOOTEN, *The "True Light which Enlightens Everyone" (John 1:9): John, Genesis, the Platonic Notion of the "True, Noetic Light," and the Allegory of the Cave in Plato's Republic*, in G.H. VAN KOOTEN (ed.), *The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-Interpretations of Genesis I in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics* (Themes in Biblical Narrative, 8), Leiden/Boston, Brill, 2005, pp. 149-194.

...the soul (...) is a whole consisting of two parts, the rational and irrational, as if it were a property shared by two persons, who have partitioned it out between them. One class has taken as its portion the rational part, that is the mind (*nous*); the other has taken the irrational, which is subdivided into the senses (*The Special Laws* 1,333).

Mind is what God and humankind have in common. At the level of human beings, mind is located in the top part of the soul, and modelled on the single Mind of God (*On the Creation* 69). As a consequence, human beings are indeed closer to God than is anything else created on earth (*The Decalogue* 134). This is what constitutes the likeness between God and humankind. Our reason is modelled on the divine reason (*logos*) and, for that reason, is not itself "the image of God", but is created "in, or after the image". There are two forms of reason (*logoi*):

One is the archetypal reason (*logos*) above us, the other the copy of it which we possess. Moses calls the first the "image of God", the second the cast of that image. For God, he says, made man not "the image of God" but "after the image" (Gen 1,27). And thus the mind (*nous*) in each of us, which in the true and full sense is the "man", is an expression at third hand from the Maker, while between them is the Logos which serves as model for our reason, but itself is the representation of God (*Who is the Heir* 230-31).

In this view, (the cast of) the divine image is born within the upper part of the soul, the mind, mediated by the Logos by which it is shaped (*The Special Laws* 3,207).

At this point, let me draw attention to the broad similarities with several aspects of Paul's anthropology in 1 Cor: (a) the same ascending hierarchy of human being – Logos / Christ – God is found in 1 Cor 11: "every man has Christ for his head", and "Christ's head is God" (11,3). Within this hierarchy, "man is the image of God, and the mirror of his glory" (11,7). This implies that this image and glory are mediated through Christ. (b) The mediating role of Christ (Philo's Logos) in the creation of humankind is also explicitly expressed in 1 Cor 8: "there is one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things, and we exist through him" (8,6). As the preposition "through" in the formula "through him" should be taken against the background of the language of prepositional metaphysics, as Sterling has convincingly argued,¹² Christ's role is indeed that

¹² G.E. STERLING, *Prepositional Metaphysics in Jewish Wisdom Speculation and Early Christian Liturgical Texts*, in D.T. RUNIA – G.E. STERLING (eds.), *Wisdom and Logos. Studies in Jewish Thought, Festschrift D. Winston* (The Studia Philonica Annual, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, 9), Atlanta, Georgia, Scholars Press, 1997, pp. 219-238.

of Philo's paradigmatic Logos on which the human mind is modelled. (c) For this reason, it can scarcely be a coincidence that Christians not only possess a human *nous* (1 Cor 1,10) but are also said to possess "the *nous* of Christ": ἡμεῖς δὲ νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν (1 Cor 2,16). This is not just a manner of speaking, but makes sense if indeed, in Philo's wording "it is the mind (*nous*) of man which has the form of God, being shaped in conformity with the ideal archetype, the Logos that is above all" (*The Special Laws* 3,207). It seems that Paul and Philo share basic anthropological convictions. This shall become clearer as we now address Philo's view on the creation of the earthly human being and his composition.

(c) The Earthly Human Being – Gen 2,7

Although the creation of the heavenly human being does indeed precede that of the earthly human being, it is important to understand that Philo, without exception, calls the earthly human being "the first human being", ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος. As in Paul, "the first human being" means "the first human being fashioned". Despite many scholarly claims to the contrary,¹³ the expression "the first human being" in Philo does not refer to the heavenly human being.¹⁴ The first insight which will transpire from a close reading of Philo's passages on the creation of the earthly human being is that Philo and Paul use the expression "the first human being" in the same sense. The second insight is that, for their views on the constitution of the first human being, both authors equally focus on Gen 2,7 LXX, the text about God breathing his breath into man: καὶ ἐπλάσεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τοῦ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν – "And God moulded the man of dust from the earth and blew into his face a breath of life, and man became a living soul".

¹³ For such claims, see, e.g., G. SELLIN, *Der Streit um die Auferstehung der Toten. Eine religionsgeschichtliche und exegetische Untersuchung von 1 Korinther 15* (FRLANT, 138), Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986; cf. H.D. BETZ, *Der Mensch in seinen Antagonismen aus der Sicht des Paulus*, in J. BEUTLER (ed.), *Der neue Mensch in Christus. Hellenistische Anthropologie und Ethik im Neuen Testament* (Quaestiones disputatae, 190), Freiburg im Breisgau, Herder, 2001, pp. 39-56, esp. 51 n. 32.

¹⁴ Cf. SCHALLER, *Adam und Christus bei Paulus* (n. 9), p. 149: "Macht man sich die – nicht einmal große – Mühe, den philonischen Sprachgebrauch zu verfolgen, dann zeigt sich, dass bei Philo an keiner einzigen Stelle der himmlische, 'der pneumatische Urmensch' als ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος bezeichnet wird. Das wird zwar in der Forschung immer wieder behauptet, trifft aber nicht zu. Erst in späteren gnostischen Texten lässt sich dieser Gebrauch nachweisen. Im philonischen Schrifttum selbst begegnet ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος durchgehend als *terminus technicus* für den irdischen Adam, für den γηγενής".

We shall look at two extensive passages in Philo about the constitution of the first human being, one from *On the Creation*, the other from *Allegorical Interpretation*. The first passage will be of help in establishing the meaning of "the first human being" in Philo, the second in drawing a more detailed outline of Philo's anthropology.

(i) Taking his starting point in Gen 2,7, Philo first points out the difference between the creation of the heavenly human being, already narrated in Gen 1,26-27, and that of the earthly human being:

By this also he [Moses] shows very clearly that there is a vast difference between the man thus formed [as described in Gen 2,7] and the man that came into existence earlier after the image of God [as described in Gen 1,26-27] (*On the Creation* 134).

Whereas "he that was after the (divine) image" was by nature incorruptible (ἄφθαρτος), the earthly human being, who consists of body and soul, is by nature mortal (θνητός). The formation of the latter is "the formation of the individual human being". In his description of this formation Philo replaces the LXX term "breath" (πνοή; Gen 2,7 LXX) with *pneuma*, which better suits his anthropological interest. The formation of the earthly human being is

a composite one made up of earthly substance and of divine breath [*pneuma*, rather than the *pnoē* of Gen 2,7 LXX]; for it says that the body was made through the Artificer taking clay and moulding out of it a human form, but that the soul was originated from nothing created whatever, but from the Father and Ruler of all: for that which He breathed in was nothing other than a Divine breath (πνεῦμα θεῖον) that migrated hither from that blissful and happy existence (*On the Creation* 135).

Having alluded to Gen 2,7, Philo states that "that first human being (ἐκεῖνος δ' ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος), earthborn (ὁ γηγενής), ancestor of our whole race, was made (...) most excellent in each part of his being, in both soul and body" (*On the Creation* 136). Philo proposes several reasons why the first human being was excellent both in soul and body. The Creator excelled in skill to bestow on humankind a body with a beautiful form, "desiring the first human being (*ton prōton anthrōpon*) to be as fair as could be to behold" (138). But also the soul of the first human being was most excellent:

...for the Creator (...) employed for its making no pattern taken from among created things, but solely, as I have said, His own Word / Reason (*logos*). It is on this account that he says that man was made a

likeness and imitation of the Word (*logos*), when the Divine Breath was breathed [ἐμπνευσθέντα < ἐμπνέω, instead of the verb ἐμφυσάω, “to blow in”, in Gen 2,7 LXX] into his face (...). Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul (κατά τε σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν), surpassing all the men that now are (*On the Creation* 139-140).

In this passage Philo also links the creation of the heavenly human being with that of the earthly human being and shows how they relate from the perspective of the latter. When the divine *pneuma* is breathed into the face of the first human being (Gen 2,7) he is made a likeness of the divine image (Gen 1,26-27), the Logos. This interconnection between the two human beings is also highlighted elsewhere in Philo's oeuvre, in a passage in which Philo criticizes the Aristotelian view “that our human mind (*nous*) is a particle of the ethereal substance”.¹⁵ This would render humankind only “a kinship with the upper air”, which is still part of creation. Instead, Philo argues, Moses

...likened the fashioning of the reasonable soul (τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος) to no created thing, but averred it to be a genuine coinage of that dread Spirit (*pneuma*), signed and impressed by the seal of God, the stamp of which is the eternal Logos. His words are “God in-breathed [again the verb *empneō*, instead of the LXX verb *emphysaō*] into his face a breath of life” (Gen 2,7); so that it cannot but be that he that receives is made in the likeness of Him who sends forth the breath. Accordingly we also read that man has been made after the image of God (Gen 1,26-27), not however after the image of anything created (*Noah's Work as a Planter* 18-20).

As in *On the Creation*, Philo shows how, in his understanding, the creation of the first, earthly human being relates to that of the heavenly human being: by receiving God's *pneuma* (Gen 2,7) the first human being “is made in the likeness (Gen 1,26-27) of Him who sends forth the *pneuma*”. We also note, in passing, that in Philo, the terminology of “mind” (*nous*), “reasonable soul” (*logikē psychē*), and “spirit” (*pneuma*) are near-synonyms.

What is clear from the extensive passage from *On the Creation* is that Philo here understands the phrase “the first human being” in the sense of the “ancestor of our whole race” (136). Or, as he explicitly says further on in *On the Creation*, as “the human being first fashioned” (140 – ὁ πρῶτος διαπλασθεὶς ἄνθρωπος), “the first-made human being” (145 – τοῦ μὲν οὖν πρώτου φύντος ἀνθρώπου ...). In this, there is no difference

¹⁵ See also PHILO, *The Special Laws* 4,123; *Allegorical Interpretation* 3,161; and *The Unchangeableness of God* 46-47.

between Philo and Paul. The latter also takes “the first human being” to mean “the first human being, Adam”, the ancestor of the entire human race. Despite the fact that Philo uses the expression “the first human being” frequently, he remains consistent in its meaning and application.

There is only one passage in Philo that seems to contravene this otherwise consistent usage. When Philo’s interpretation reaches the story of the creation of Eve, and he needs to comment on Gen 2,18, “It is not good that any human being should be alone”, Philo applies the text to both human beings we have so far encountered, the heavenly and the earthly human being:

For there are two races of men, the one made after the (divine) image (Gen 1,26-27), and the one moulded out of the earth (Gen 2,7). For *the man made after the image* it is not good to be alone, because he yearns after the Image (...). Far less is it good for *the man moulded of the earth* to be alone. Nay, it is impossible (...). With *the second man* (τῷ δὲ δευτέρῳ ἀνθρώπῳ) a helper is associated ... (*Allegorical Interpretation* 2,4-5).

In this passage, the earthly human being is referred to as “the second human being”. This, however, is no breach of Philo’s consistent reference to Adam as “the first human being” but is due to the specific order of the two human beings in this specific exposition. “Second” here clearly means the second of both human beings which were enumerated in this passage. That Adam is called “the second human being” in this context cannot be used as evidence that, as a matter of fact, “the first human being” is the heavenly human being in Philo. The contextual nature of the need to call Adam this time “the second human being” is confirmed by the fact, that further on in *Allegorical Interpretation*, Adam is again called “the first generated [human being]”, ὁ πρῶτος γενόμενος (2,15). At the same time, it is telling that the passage just discussed is the only instance, in Philo’s entire oeuvre, in which he uses the phrase “the second human being”. As the extensive passage from *On the Creation* quoted above has shown, Philo, like Paul, applies the phrase “the first human being” to the first generated human being, Adam. And, as another extensive passage from *Allegorical Interpretation* will show, again like Paul, Philo refers to the two human beings as the “heavenly” and the “earthly” human being respectively. This passage will also deepen our understanding of Philo’s anthropology.

(ii) In his *Allegorical Interpretation*, Philo gives a detailed interpretation of Gen 2,7, “And God formed humankind by taking clay from the earth,

and breathed into his face a breath (πνοή) of life, and the man became a living soul". According to Philo,

There are two types of men; the one a *heavenly* man, the other an *earthly* (διττὰ ἀνθρώπων γένη· ὁ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὐράνιος ἄνθρωπος, ὁ δὲ γήϊνος). *The heavenly man*, being made after the image of God (Gen 1,26-27), is altogether without part or lot in corruptible and terrestrial substance; but *the earthly one* was compacted out of matter (...). For this reason he [Moses] says that *the heavenly man* was not moulded, but was stamped with the image of God (Gen 1,26-27); while *the earthly* is a moulded work (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,31)

In his interpretation of Gen 2,7 proper, Philo rather bluntly states that we "must account the human being made out of the earth εἶναι νοῦν εἰσκρινόμενον σώματι, οὐπω δ' εἰσκεκριμένον, to be mind mingling with, but not yet blended with, body" (1,32). The "body" is of course implied in the "clay of the earth", from which the first human being was formed (Gen 2,7), but it remains unclear whence Philo derives "the mind", which he regards as being, at the point of Gen 2,7, in the yet unfinished process of "mingling with (...) body". Philo calls this mind the "earthlike mind". It is, in all likelihood, the mind which is modelled on the "heavenlike" mind of the heavenly human being, which functions as its archetype. Yet, interestingly, Philo makes clear that, during its formative phase, this earthlike mind is still corruptible as long as it has not yet been breathed into by God:

But this earthlike mind is in reality also corruptible, were not God to breathe into it a power of real life (ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός, εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς); when He does so, it no longer undergoes any moulding, but becomes a soul (τότε γὰρ γίνεται ... εἰς ψυχὴν), not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive (ἀλλ' εἰς νοερὰν καὶ ζῶσαν ὄντως; *Allegorical Interpretation* 1,32).

This means that at his creation, the first human being was breathed into by God. As Philo explains, this expression, "breathed into",

...implies of necessity three things, (1) that which inbreathes, (2) that which receives, (3) that which is inbreathed: that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit / breath (*pneuma*). What, then, do we infer from these premises? A union of the three comes about, as God projects the power that proceeds from Himself through the mediant breath till it reaches the subject (1,37).

From this passage it becomes possible to determine the exact relation between “mind” (*nous*) and “spirit” (*pneuma*) in Philo. The “mind” is the highest part of the soul, as it is in contemporary Greek philosophy: humankind consists of body and soul, and within the soul the leading part, the *nous*, is differentiated from the lower soul, made up of the senses. This tripartite thinking is adopted by Philo, but under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2,7 he is able to link the *nous* with the *pneuma*.¹⁶ Properly speaking, the *nous* is not identical with the *pneuma* (*nous* ≠ *pneuma*). Rather the *pneuma* is greater than or equal to the *nous* (*pneuma* ≥ *nous*) because, in Philo’s view, it is within the *nous* that the *pneuma* is received, the *nous* is the receptacle. The *nous*, in turn, mediates this *pneuma* to the rest of the soul so that this spirit dominates both *nous* and (the rest of the) *psychē*:

...the mind [is] the dominant element of the soul (ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικόν ἐστὶν ὁ νοῦς): into this only does God breathe (τούτῳ μόνῳ ἐμπνεῖ ὁ θεός). (...) the mind imparts to the portion of the soul that is devoid of reason a share of that which it has received from God, so that the mind was besouled by God (ὥστε τὸν μὲν νοῦν ἐψυχῶσθαι ὑπὸ θεοῦ), but the unreasoning part by the mind (τὸ δὲ ἄλογον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ; *Allegorical Interpretation* 1,39-40).

If the *nous* is indeed inbreathed by, and filled with the divine *pneuma* it becomes synonymous with the *pneuma*. This shows that Philo not only knows the triad *nous*, *psychē* and *sōma*, in accordance with Greek philosophy, but also, under the influence of his exegesis of Gen 2,7, the similar triad *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma*. This latter triad does not occur in Greek philosophers,¹⁷ but is found in Jewish authors such as Philo, Flavius Josephus (*Jewish Antiquities* 1,34; cf. 3,260), and Paul (see section 3). The triad *pneuma*, *psychē* and *sōma* is the Jewish equivalent of the Greek tripartite division of human beings in terms of *nous*, *psychē* and *sōma*, which is read from the perspective of Gen 2,7. Since this passage is explicitly quoted by Philo, Paul and Josephus, their interpretation

¹⁶ This has also been noted by A.J. FESTUGIÈRE, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (Études bibliques), Paris, Lecoq-Gabalda, 2nd edn, 1932, Appendix B: “La division corps—âme—esprit de 1 Thessal. 5.23 et la philosophie grecque”, pp. 196-220, esp. 212-217.

¹⁷ “Pneuma” does occur in relation to *nous* and *psychē* in *Corpus Hermeticum* 10,16, but there *pneuma* is not equivalent with *nous* and not superior but inferior to *psychē* since, as Dillon explains, it is taken “in the sense of the basic life-force, which forms a sort of “cushion” for the soul when united to a body (the “pneumatic vehicle” of later Platonism)”; DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), p. 42.

seems to reflect a common Jewish understanding of Gen 2,7 LXX in the first century CE. This is an important finding, I believe, which indicates that the allegedly Gnostic distinction between the pneumatic, psychic and sarkic human being is not a Gnostic invention, but rather a development of this Jewish-Hellenistic interpretation of Gen 2,7 and its consequent tripartization of humankind.

According to Philo, the reason why God breathes the *pneuma* into the human *nous* is as follows:

And for what purpose save that we may obtain a conception of him? For how could the soul have conceived of God, had He not breathed into it and mightily laid hold of it? For the mind of man would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,37-38).

As we have seen, Philo's reflections on the relation between *pneuma* and *nous* are based on his interpretation of Gen 2,7. There is, however, one complication which threatens to blur Philo's exegesis: the fact that the text of Gen 2,7 LXX – as I have already pointed out in passing – does not read *pneuma* (“breath” or “spirit”) but *pnoē* (“breath”). Only here in *Allegorical Interpretation* does Philo raise awareness of this textual problem. Everywhere else Philo interprets Gen 2,7 LXX as if the text reads *pneuma*. The reason that Philo draws attention to the actual Septuagint reading in *Allegorical Interpretation* is that, in his understanding of Gen 1–2, it is only in the case of the creation of the earthly human being (Gen 2,7), and not in that of the heavenly human being (Gen 1,26-27), that Moses seems to speak of the inbreathing of the divine *pneuma*. Given the importance of this *pneuma* it would seem odd that Moses fails to mention it when describing the creation of the *heavenly* human being:

The question might be asked, why God deemed the earthly and body-loving mind (τὸν γηγενῆ καὶ φιλοσώματον νοῦν) worthy of divine breath (ἡξίωσεν ... πνεύματος θείου) at all, but not the mind which had been created after the original (τὸν κατὰ τὴν ἰδέαν γεγονότα; *Allegorical Interpretation* 1,33).

This question is answered, Philo suggests, when closer scrutiny reveals that Moses, in speaking of the creation of the earthly human being, does not speak of the divine *pneuma*, but rather of the divine *pnoē*:

He uses the word “breath” (*pnoē*) not “spirit” (*pneuma*), implying a difference between them; for “spirit” is conceived of as connoting strength and vigour and power, while a “breath” is like an air of peaceful and gentle vapour. The mind that was made after the image and original (Gen 1,26-27) might be said to partake of spirit (*pneuma*), for

its reasoning faculty possesses robustness; but the mind that was made out of matter (Gen 2,7) must be said to partake of the light and less substantial air (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,42).

In this way, Philo makes sense of the LXX reading *pnoē* in Gen 2,7. In his view, the qualitative difference between the mind of the heavenly human being and that of the earthly human being is reflected in the fact that the latter is said to have received the divine *pnoē*, whereas the former “might be said to partake of *pneuma*”.¹⁸ In his *Allegorical Interpretation* Philo offers an unusual, very close reading and interpretation of Gen 2,7. The problem-generating, rather than problem-solving nature of the passage just discussed serves to show that Jewish authors such as Philo did indeed face textual difficulties when they tried to develop the Graeco-Roman trichotomy of *sōma* – *psychē* – *nous* into a Jewish trichotomy of *sōma* – *psychē* – *pneuma*. Normally, however – in other writings but also elsewhere in his *Allegorical Interpretation* – Philo does not hesitate to say that God’s *pneuma* (not his *pnoē*) was received by the *earthly* human being: “that which inbreathes is God, that which receives is the mind (*nous*), that which is inbreathed is the spirit (*pneuma*)” (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,37).

This is confirmed by many other passages which suggest that it is the divine *pneuma* which is breathed into humans. Humankind is akin (συγγενής) to God because “the divine Spirit (*pneuma*) had poured into him in full flow” (*On the Creation* 144). The human mind (*nous*) is closely linked to the divine *pneuma*: “it would be strange if a light substance like the mind (*nous*) were not rendered buoyant and raised to the utmost height by the native force of the divine Spirit (*pneuma*)” (*Noah’s Work as a Planter* 24). An interesting case is a passage in *The Special Laws*, in which Gen 2,7 and Gen 1,26-27 are merged into a single view: “our dominant part [is] the rational *pneuma* within us (ἐν ἡμῖν λογικὸν πνεῦμα), which was shaped according to the archetypal form of the divine image” (1,171).

Spirit and Blood

In a special set of passages in Philo, the *pneuma*, as the substance of the *nous*, is clearly and persistently contrasted with the blood, which is considered to be the substance of the rest of the soul. In these passages Philo aims to do justice to what he regards as another important anthropological

¹⁸ Cf. Philo *Noah’s Work as a Planter* 44.

assertion in the Jewish scripture, that of Lev 17,11: “the soul of every flesh is his blood” – ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πάσης σαρκὸς αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἐστίν. We shall now consider these passages, as the contrast which Philo draws between *pneuma* on the one hand, and “flesh” and “blood” on the other is very similar to Paul’s language.

Philo’s challenge is to reconcile two different, and seemingly contradictory views on the substance of the soul – (1) that of Gen 2,7, according to which, at least in Philo’s understanding, the soul consists of *pneuma*; and (2) that of Lev 17,11, which contends that the soul consists of blood. Philo’s solution is to distinguish between two types of soul: the leading part of the soul, the *nous*, and the rest of the soul, which is simply called “soul”. This is brought out in the following passage in *Who Is the Heir*, which also shows that Philo, in the construction of his anthropology, refers to the three key texts of Gen 1,26-27, Gen 2,7, and Lev 17,11:

We use “soul” in two senses (ψυχὴ διχῶς λέγεται), both for the whole soul (ἡ τε ὅλη) and also for its dominant part, which properly speaking is the soul’s soul (καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος, ὃ κυρίως εἰπεῖν ψυχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστίν). (...) And therefore the lawgiver [Moses] held that the substance of the soul is twofold (ἐδοξε ... διττὴν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ψυχῆς), blood being that of the soul as a whole (αἷμα μὲν τῆς ὅλης), and the divine spirit (*pneuma*) that of its most dominant part (τοῦ δ’ ἡγεμονικωτάτου πνεῦμα θεῖον). Thus he says plainly “the soul of every flesh is the blood” (Lev 17,11). (...) On the other hand he did not make the substance of the mind (τοῦ δὲ νοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν) depend on anything created, but represented it as breathed upon by God (ὁπὸ θεοῦ καταπνευσθεῖσαν). For the Maker of all, he says, “blew into this face the breath of life, and man became a living soul” (Gen 2,7); just as we are also told that he was fashioned after the image of his Maker (Gen 1,26-27) (*Who Is the Heir* 55-56).

The *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the *nous*, the leading part of the human soul. Basing himself on the three Scriptural passages from Genesis and Leviticus, Philo reaches the following conclusion:

So we have two kinds of man (ὥστε διττὸν εἶδος ἀνθρώπων), those who live by reason, the divine *pneuma* (τὸ μὲν θεῖον πνεῦματι λογισμῷ βιούντων), and those who live by blood and the pleasure of the flesh (τὸ δὲ αἵματι καὶ σαρκὸς ἡδονῇ ζώντων). This last is a moulded clod of earth, the other is the faithful impress of the divine image (*Who Is the Heir* 57).

As we shall see in due course, Philo’s distinction between “those who live by the divine *pneuma*” and “those who live by blood and the pleasure

of the flesh" resembles that in Paul between the *pneumatikoi* ("those who live by the *pneuma*") on the one hand and the *psychikoi* ("those who live by the lower *psychē*") or the *sarkinoi* / *sarkikoi* ("those who live by the flesh") on the other. Although, as Philo clearly indicates, the substance of the soul is twofold (*Who Is the Heir* 55-56) and consists of *pneuma* (for the *nous*) and blood (for the rest of the soul), the two layers which are as such present in every human being are nevertheless exemplified in two distinct types of human beings (*Who Is the Heir* 57). "Those who live by the *pneuma*" have their soul directed by the divine *pneuma* which has been breathed into the human *nous*, whereas "those who live by the flesh" limit the effectiveness of their soul to its lower part, that of the senses.

This might be a good point to note that, whereas in *Who Is the Heir* Philo distinguishes between two types of human beings, elsewhere, in *On the Giants*, the tripartite nature of humankind is made manifest in three distinct types of human beings:

...some men are earth-born, some heaven-born, and some God-born (οἱ μὲν γῆς, οἱ δὲ οὐρανοῦ, οἱ δὲ θεοῦ γεγόνασιν ἄνθρωποι). The earth-born are those who take the pleasures of the body (*sōma*) for their quarry (...). The heaven-born are the votaries of the arts and of knowledge, the lovers of learning. For the heavenly element in us is the mind (τὸ γὰρ οὐράνιον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ὁ νοῦς), as the heavenly beings are each of them a mind. (...) But the men of God are priests and prophets who (...) have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception and have been translated into the world of the intelligible (τὸ δὲ ἀσθητὸν πᾶν ὑπερκύψαντες εἰς τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον μετανέστησαν). (...) But the sons of earth have turned the steps of mind out of the path of reason (οἱ δὲ γῆς παῖδες τὸν νοῦν ἐκβιβάσαντες τοῦ λογίζεσθαι) and transmuted it into the soulless and inert nature of the flesh (καὶ μεταλλοιώσαντες εἰς τὴν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον σαρκῶν φύσιν) (*On the Giants* 60-61.65).

This passage, together with the combined evidence of the previous passage from *Who Is the Heir*, shows that Philo's tripartition of humankind develops into a theory of three kinds of human beings.¹⁹ As John Dillon has shown, this scheme of three classes of humans predates but is essentially similar to schemes in ancient philosophers such as Plutarch (*On the Sign of Socrates* 591D-592C) and Plotinus (*Enneads* 5,9,1), schemes

¹⁹ Cf. A. MENDELSON, *Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria* (Monographs of the Hebrew Union College, 7), Cincinnati, OH, Hebrew Union College Press – New York, Ktav, 1982, chap. 3 on "Philo's typology of mankind", esp. chap. 3.1 and 3.2.

which have also been adopted in Gnostic anthropology (Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 54).²⁰ Such a differentiation between various types of human beings can clearly be recognized in the passages from Philo examined above – the three types of humankind in *On the Giants*, the two types of humankind in *Who Is the Heir*. In Philo, the difference between the highest type of humans and the lower one is buttressed by his references to Gen 2,7 and Lev 17,11 respectively: whereas *pneuma* is the substance of the *nous*, blood is the substance of the (lower, irrational) *psychē* which is devoid of *pneuma*.

In another similar passage dealing with Lev 17,11, Philo states: “the fleshly nature (ἡ σαρκῶν φύσις) has received no share of mind (*nous*)”. Human beings are a “living creature with two natures (τὸ διφυὲς ζῶον)”; they are a “composite mass”, which consists of (1) “the highest form in which life shows itself”, the mind (*nous*), reason or spirit (*pneuma*), “that God-like creation with which we reason”, whose “nourishment [is] celestial and imperishable (*aphthartos*), not perishable (*phtartos*) and earthly”, and of (2) “the fleshly nature”, whose life is the blood (Lev 17,11) (*The Worse Attacks the Better* 83-85).

This lower part of the soul, as another passage makes clear, is the soul which “gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common” and “operates through the senses”.²¹ This passage merits quoting in full because it combines various important notions outlined so far. The divine *pneuma* is clearly depicted as the substance of the mind. And at the same time, the “first human being” unambiguously stands for the “founder of our race”, Adam:

Blood is prohibited for the reason which I have mentioned that it is the essence of the soul (Lev 17,11), not of the intelligent and reasonable soul, but of that which operates through the senses (οὐσία ψυχῆς ἐστίν – οὐχὶ τῆς νοερᾶς καὶ λογικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς), the soul that gives the life which we and the irrational animals possess in common. For the essence or substance of that other soul is divine spirit (*pneuma*), a truth vouched for by Moses especially, who in his story of the creation says that God breathed a breath of life upon the first man (Gen 2,7), the founder of our race (καὶ ἀρχηγέτη τοῦ γένους ἡμῶν), into the lordliest part of his body, the face, where the senses are stationed like bodyguards to the great king, the mind (*nous*) (*The Special Laws* 4,123).

²⁰ DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), pp. 40-41 with n. 22.

²¹ For the differentiation of the soul into (a) a rational and intelligent soul and (b) a sense-perceptive and vital soul, see also PHILO's *Quaestiones in Genesin* 2,59; and *The Special Laws* 3,99.

The *pneuma*, then, is the substance of the human *nous*, as other passages confirm: "Now the divine Spirit is the substance of the rational (part)" (*Quaestiones in Genesin* 2,59).

Now we have seen the basic expressions of Philo's anthropological views, I shall demonstrate that, according to Philo, humankind has been subject to degeneration because the pneumatic-noetic part of its soul has been lost. For this reason, the soul (i.e. the lower soul) should be restored to its original archetype, the heavenly human being.

2.2. *The Degeneration and Fall of Humankind*

Speaking about the current descendants of the first earthly human being, Philo is both positive and critical. Having described "the beauty of the first-made human being (τοῦ μὲν οὖν πρώτου φύντοϲ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ... κάλλος) in each part of his being, in soul and body", Philo remarks:

It could not but be that his descendants, partaking as they did in the original form in which he was formed, should preserve marks, though faint ones, of their kinship with their first father. Now what is this kinship? Every man, in respect of his mind (διάνοια), is allied to the divine Reason, having come into being as a copy or fragment or ray of that blessed nature (*On the Creation* 145-146).

Despite this positive resemblance between us and the first earthly human being, in other passages Philo stresses the degeneration and fall of humankind. This degeneration is partly due to natural developments since creation. In this Philo follows particular views on the physical degeneration of the world and its inhabitants due to the ageing of the world (*mundus senescens*).²² According to Philo,

Such was the first man created, as I think, in body and soul, surpassing all the men that now are, and all that have been before us. (...) the man

²² Cf. AULUS GELLIUS, *Attic Nights* 3,10,11: "...the men of old were larger and taller of stature, but now, because the world is ageing, as it were (*et nunc, quasi iam mundo senescente*), men and things are diminishing in size". On this theme of the loss of the world's original vitality, see G.J.M. BARTELINK, *Mundus senescens*, in *Hermeneus* 42 (1970), 91-98; and G.J.M. BARTELINK, *Le thème du monde vieilli*, in *Orpheus* 4 (1983), 342-354, who characterizes this view as Epicurean, with reference to LUCRETIUS, *On the Nature of Things* 2,1173-1174: "... all things gradually decay, and go to the reef of destruction, outworn by the ancient lapse of years (*spatio aetatis defessa vetusto*)" (BARTELINK, *Mundus senescens* [see above] pp. 91-93). Otherwise than Bartelink, I believe the concept is also Stoic, because irrespective of the fact that the cosmos is eternally recurrent, the present cosmos is fading away. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the Stoics regarded the world as admitting of deterioration and destruction.

first fashioned was clearly the bloom of our entire race, and never have his descendants attained the like bloom, forms and faculties ever feebler having been bestowed on each succeeding generation (*On the Creation* 140).

To illustrate this natural process of degeneration, Philo points to the received wisdom in the arts, in sculpture and painting, that “the copies are inferior to the originals”. He also uses the example of the magnet which gradually loses its hold over the objects which depend from it (*On the Creation* 141). This illustrates his point that humankind goes through a similar process in which the original force diminishes through time (*On the Creation* 141). Although “the sovereignty with which that first human being was invested was a most lofty one”, many generations later, “owing to the lapse of ages, the race had lost its vigour” (*On the Creation* 148).

But Philo does not give only physical reasons for the degeneration of humankind. He also speaks about the first *moral* lapse of humankind in the garden of Eden. In Philo’s view, at the very beginning, the garden was populated by two human beings, the heavenly human being and the earthly one, and it was the latter who was cast out. Philo justifies this view of two different inhabitants of Eden by referring to two different phrases in the account of Gen 2 on the garden. According to Gen 2,8 LXX, God “placed there the man *whom He had moulded*” (καὶ ἔθετο ἐκεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν ἐπλασεν), whereas Gen 2,15, at least according to Philo, reads as follows: “The Lord God took the man *whom He had made*, and placed him in the garden to work on it and to guard it” – ἔλαβε κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν ἐποίησε καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάσσειν (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,53).²³ According to Philo, the latter

...is a different man, the one that was made after the image and archetype, so that two men are introduced into the garden, the one a moulded being, the other “after the image” (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,53).

Whereas the latter is received by God, the former is cast out of the garden of Eden: “the moulded mind (ὁ δὲ πλαστὸς νοῦς) (...) soon runs away and is cast out” (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,55); he is “the more earthly mind”, as opposed to the less material, pure mind (1,88-89). Because of his constitution, it is the earthly human being, Adam, “the earthly and

²³ As a matter of fact, however, Gen 2,15 LXX also reads *eplasen* (like Gen 2,8), not *epoiēse*: καὶ ἔλαβεν κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὃν ἐπλασεν, καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάσσειν.

perishable mind",²⁴ who needs to be commanded by God. This is not necessary for the "mind that was made after the image", which is "not earthly but heavenly" – "the being created after [God's] image and after the original idea" (1,90-92). In a passage which is highly relevant for our study of 1 Cor in section 3 below, this heavenly mind is called "the perfect human being" and contrasted with the bad human being and the child, who do need commandments and instruction:

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (τῷ τελείῳ τῷ κατ' εἰκόνα), for none of these does the perfect man (ὁ τέλειος) require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (τῷ νηπίῳ) of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,94).

This way of thinking is very similar to that of Paul who considers his Corinthian opponents as "children" (*nēpioi*; 1 Cor 3,14), and not as "perfect human beings" (*teleioi*; 1 Cor 2,6), because they fail to live up to their pneumatic potential and are therefore not *pneumatikoi* (2,13.15; 3,1) but simply *psychikoi* (2,14) and *sarkinoi* (3,1.3).

Philo subsequently explains how the earthly mind can experience downfall if it fails to give heed to God's commandments:

Quite naturally, then, does God give the commandments and exhortations before us to the earthly mind who is neither bad nor good but midway between these. (...) Should he obey the exhortations, he may be deemed worthy by God of His benefactions; but (...), should he rebel, he may be driven from the presence of the Lord (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,94).

The last option, that of a rebellious earthly mind, is the one which materializes, as Philo makes clear in another writing. Despite the "nobility of birth" of the "first and earth-born human being", "moulded with consummate skill into the figure of the human body by the hand of God (...), and judged worthy to receive his soul (...) through the breath of God (ἐμπνεύσαντος θεοῦ)" (*On the Virtues* 203), he made the wrong moral choice:

...his father was no mortal but the eternal God, whose image he was in a sense in virtue of the ruling mind within the soul (οὗ τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενος εἰκὼν κατὰ τὸν ἡγεμόνα νοῦν ἐν ψυχῇ). Yet though he should have kept that image undefiled and followed as far as he could in the steps of his Parent's virtues, when the opposites were set before

²⁴ Cf. *Who Is the Heir* 52.

him to choose or avoid, good and evil, honourable and base, true and false, he was quick to choose the false, the base and the evil and spurn the good and honourable and true, with the natural consequence that he exchanged mortality for immortality, forfeited his blessedness and happiness and found an easy passage to a life of toil and misery (*On the Virtues* 204-205).

This moral lapse is repeated every time the mind comes to love the body and the passions (*The Unchangeableness of God* 111).

Following his tripartite division of humankind into body, soul, and mind, Philo portrays the degeneration of humankind as a consequence of the soul which wavers in the middle, to the detriment of the mind (*On Husbandry* 89). Or, alternatively, Philo can portray the earthly mind as the medial or neutral mind, as we have already seen in his *Allegorical Interpretation*: “the earthly mind (...) is neither bad nor good but mid-way between these” (1,94). This mind is played upon by the opposing forces of good and evil (*Noah’s Work as a Planter* 45).²⁵

In many passages Philo sketches the negative outcome of this strife between body and mind, “the cycle of unceasing war ever revolving round the many-sided soul” (*On Dreams* 2,14) – the κύκλος περὶ τὴν πολύτροπον ψυχὴν αἰδίου πολέμου. In one of them, he talks, in a “Pauline” fashion, about “the order of the flesh”:

...when that which is superior, namely Mind, becomes one with that which is inferior, namely Sense-perception, it resolves itself into the order of the flesh (τὸ σαρκὸς γένος) which is inferior (*Allegorical Interpretation* 2,50).

Philo sees the downfall of the mind illustrated in many stories in the Bible.²⁶ Philo’s repetitive remarks on the loss of humankind’s pneumatic-noetic identity also serve a concrete polemical purpose. This becomes clear in two passages in which Philo attacks the sophists (and Protagoras in particular), who are of the opinion that the human mind is the measure of all things. In Philo’s time the Second Sophistic movement was just taking off and becoming a dominant cultural force.²⁷ Philo poses the following rhetorical question and immediately answers it:

²⁵ Cf. also *On Rewards and Punishments* 62ff. in a passage which reads like a Philonic counterpart to the *Treatise of the Two Spirits* in *The Community Rule*, 1QS 3–4.

²⁶ See *The Worse Attacks the Better* 100: Cain’s murder of Abel; *The Unchangeableness of God* 2 and *On the Giants* 15,65: the fall of the angels; *The Sacrifices of Abel and Cain* 122: the story of Sodom; *On the Change of Names* 107: the story of the Midianites. Cf. also *Quaestiones in Exodum* 2,26 and *The Special Laws* 4,188.

²⁷ On Philo and the sophists, see B.W. WINTER, *Philo and Paul Among the Sophists. Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses to a Julio-Claudian Movement – Second*

Of what sort than is an impious man's opinion? That the human mind is the measure of all things (μέτρον εἶναι πάντων χρημάτων τὸν ἀνθρώπινον νοῦν), an opinion held they tell us by an ancient sophist named Protagoras, an offspring of Cain's madness (*The Posterity of Cain* 35-37).

This opinion is contrasted with that of Moses: "But Moses held that God, and not the human mind, is the measure and weighing scale and numbering of all things" (*On Dreams* 2,193-94).

2.3. Restoration of the Human Mind and Spirit

As we have already seen in section 2.1c on the creation of the earthly human being, "the earthly and body-loving mind" was inbreathed by God's *pneuma* at the very moment of creation. The reason stated for this was that "the mind of humankind would never have ventured to soar so high as to grasp the nature of God, had not God Himself drawn it up to Himself" (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,37-38). One could argue that here there is already a primordial restoration of the human mind while its creation is still taking place (1,32). The earthlike mind, which in Philo's view is modelled on the mind of the heavenly human being, would have remained corruptible if God's *pneuma* had not breathed into it. This sets the model for Philo's considerations about the restoration of the mind in other parts of his writings: the earthlike mind needs the breath of God's *pneuma* to become "a soul, not an inefficient and imperfectly formed soul, but one endowed with mind and actually alive" (1,32).

The biblical narrative which, according to Philo, is all about the restoration of the human mind, is the story of Abraham's migration from Haran; this migration symbolizes the mind's departure from the dominance of the lower soul and the senses (*The Migration of Abraham* 13). Abraham and Lot are presented as contrasting figures which symbolize, respectively, the mind and the soul. According to Philo, the migration of the mind occurs in several stages, the most important of which are accurate self-knowledge and knowledge of God himself (*The Migration of*

Edition, Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2002 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1st edn. 1997); and G.H. VAN KOOTEN, *Balaam as the Sophist Par Excellence in Philo of Alexandria: Philo's Projection of an Urgent Contemporary Debate onto Moses' Pentateuchal Narratives*, in G.H. VAN KOOTEN – J.T.A.G.M. VAN RUITEN (eds.), *The Prestige of the Pagan Prophet Balaam in Judaism, Early Christianity and Islam* (Themes in Biblical Narrative, 11), Leiden – Boston, Brill, 2008, pp. 131-161.

Abraham 194-95). This is a gradual process of migration. Indeed, as Philo himself summarizes his account of Abraham's migration, towards the end of his treatise: "To resume: the mind (...) has gone forth from the places about Haran ..." (216). The entire migration of Abraham is interpreted as a restoration of the mind and its journey towards God.

From some passages in Philo, one gets the impression that his soteriology, his view on how the human mind is restored, is closely related to education. In one passage, for instance, Philo states that parents benefit their children by having their bodies trained in the gymnasium, and that they

...have done the same for the soul by means of letters and arithmetic and geometry and music and philosophy as a whole *which lifts on high the mind (nous) lodged within the mortal body* and escorts it to the very heaven and shows it the blessed and happy beings that dwell therein (*The Special Laws* 2,230).

The educational nature of this soteriology is confirmed by Philo's somewhat elitist remark about the small number of those who despise vanity:

This kind is few in number. (...) After investigating the whole realm of the visible to its very end, it straightway proceeds to the immaterial and conceptual, not availing itself of any of the senses but casting aside all the irrational parts of the soul (*psychē*) and employing only the part which is called mind (*nous*) and reasoning (*On Rewards and Punishments* 26).

This selective attitude differs considerably from the popularizing potential of Paul's theory about Christ as the heavenly human being, in whose identity all are invited to join and experience a transformation of the mind.

Yet, Philo's educational drive clearly serves an ethical purpose. As we have already seen,

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image, for none of these does the perfect man require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,94).

Instead of describing Philo's soteriology as "educational", it is perhaps more appropriate to call it a "psychological soteriology", which aims at the formation of the soul. This soteriology is built on the tripartite definition of humankind in terms of mind (or spirit), soul and body, and entails the view that the mind, purified and restored by the divine spirit, influences (the rest of) the soul which, in its turn, transforms the body. This soteriology comes to the fore in three passages. In his commentary on Gen 28,14, "in thee shall all tribes be blessed", Philo says:

...if the mind which is in me (ὁ ἐν ἐμοὶ νοῦς) has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, then the "tribes" [Gen 28,14: "in thee shall all tribes be blessed"] of that which is earthly in me are sharers of its purifying, those I mean which pertain to the senses (αἱ αἰσθησεις) and to that chiefest container, the body (*sōma*) (*On Dreams* 1,177).

In this passage the purified mind clearly influences and purifies the lower soul of the senses, and also the body. For this reason, Philo warns against the dominance of the concerns of soul and body over what should be the guiding principle, the mind:

If we hold that moral beauty is the only good, the end we seek is contracted and narrowed, for it is bound up with only one of our myriad environments, namely, with the dominant principle, the mind (*nous*). But if we connect that end with three different kinds of interests, the concerns of the soul (*psychē*), those of the body (*sōma*) and those of the external world, the end is split up into many dissimilar parts and thus broadened (*On Sobriety* 60).

That God's spirit influences both soul and body is also shown in a passage about Abraham:

...the divine spirit which was breathed upon him from on high made its lodging in his soul, and invested his body with singular beauty (*On the Virtues* 217).

That Philo uses the language of Gen 2,7 about the inbreathing of God's Spirit not only with regard to Adam, but also with regard to his descendants, such as Abraham, shows that his reflections on the creation of Adam are applicable to all humankind. Although the singular beauty of Abraham's body is doubtlessly exceptional, it nevertheless demonstrates that, in Philo's anthropology, *pneuma* influences the soul, and the soul, in turn, the body.

Once this psychological soteriology is understood, it can easily be recognized in Paul. Already in 1 Thess, Paul warns the Thessalonians not to suppress the Spirit (5,19: τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε) and wishes that God himself may keep them sound in spirit, soul, and body, free from any fault: καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως ... τηρηθείη (5,23). As in Philo, the link between God's Spirit (*Pneuma*) and the spirit (*pneuma*) of humankind is not coincidental but shows that the human spirit was inbreathed by God's Spirit.

Against the ancient philosophical and Philonic background outlined in the present article, it is clear that Paul's trichotomy of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body in 1 Thess 5,23 is equally technical. This triad has been misunderstood by Udo Schnelle in one of the few anthropologies of the New

Testament which have been written. Schnelle explicitly denies that the triad should be taken in a technical Hellenistic sense:

The trichotomous *sounding* phrase τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα reflects no Hellenistic anthropology according to which a person is divided into body, soul, and spirit. Paul is merely emphasizing that the sanctifying work of God concerns the whole person.²⁸

Schnelle is apparently unaware of the parallels which Paul's contemporary fellow-Jews Philo and Josephus provide in differentiating between *pneuma* and *psychē* on the basis of Gen 2,7, in this way establishing a Jewish counterpart to the Greek differentiation between *nous* and *psychē*. In this light, Schnelle's comments on the meaning of *pneuma* in 1 Thess 5,23 become artificial and incomprehensible:

...in 1 Thessalonians πνεῦμα is for Paul not a component of the human essence but the expression and sign of the new creativity of God in humankind. With ψυχὴ and σῶμα Paul is only adding what constitutes each person as an individual. What is actually new and determinative is the Spirit of God.²⁹

This is clearly untrue, even though it may reflect a common view in New Testament scholarship. In Paul's triad *pneuma*, *psychē* and body, the *pneuma* is a component of humankind, as the comparisons with Philo unequivocally show. It is part of the triad which characterizes humankind as a trichotomous being. Of course it is true that elsewhere in 1 Thess the *pneuma* does denote the spirit of God. As Paul reminds the Thessalonians, God has given them his holy *pneuma*: anyone who flouts particular ethical rules "is flouting not man but the God who bestows on you his holy Spirit" – ... ἀλλὰ τὸν θεὸν τὸν δίδόντα τὸ πνεῦμα αὐτοῦ τὸ ἅγιον εἰς ὑμᾶς (1 Thess 4,8). Therefore, at the end of the letter, the Thessalonians are warned not to suppress the spirit, i.e. the Spirit of God: τὸ πνεῦμα μὴ σβέννυτε (1 Thess 5,19). But the gift of the Spirit results in the reconstitution of humankind's own *pneuma*, and for this reason he should keep sound "in *pneuma*, *psychē* and body" (1 Thess 5,23). By partaking in the Spirit of God, humankind possesses a *pneuma* which is

²⁸ U. SCHNELLE, *The Human Condition. Anthropology in the Teachings of Jesus, Paul, and John* (transl. by O.C. DEAN, Jr), Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1996, pp. 104-105, esp. 104 (italics mine).

²⁹ *Ibid.*; Th.K. HECKEL, *Body and Soul in Saint Paul*, in J.P. WRIGHT – P. POTTER (eds.), *Psyche and Soma* (n. 2), chap. 5, pp. 117-131, esp. 130 n. 36 seems to be aware of the Greek background of "the tripartite body-soul-pneuma synthesis in 1 Thess. 5:23", but stresses Paul's free interpretation of it, without further explanation.

part of his own constitution. Against the background of Philonic and Hellenistic trichotomous anthropology, this is perfectly clear. Classicists, incidentally, have no difficulty in recognizing the philosophical nature of Paul's anthropology. André-Jean Festugière, for instance, devotes an extensive excursus to the ancient philosophical background of 1 Thess 5,23 in his *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (1932).³⁰

The presupposition at work in Schnelle's interpretation is that 1 Thess, as Paul's first letter, contains only a simple, rudimentary theology which will be developed further over the years:

As the oldest document of Pauline theology, the First Letter to the Thessalonians shows rather that the continuing passage of time was of great significance in the formation of the apostle's anthropology. This letter lacks all the important anthropological terms of later letters, such as σάρξ ("flesh"), ἁμαρτία ("sin"), θάνατος ("death"), ἐλευθερία ("freedom"), ζωή ("life").³¹

Yet although 1 Thess is indeed Paul's first preserved letter, this view neglects the fact that, prior to his visits to the cities of the Eastern Mediterranean, Paul had already spent about fourteen years in the Roman province of Syria and Cilicia, in cities such as Antioch and Tarsus, where he must already have tested the reception of his gospel by the Hellenized world (Gal 1,21-2,2). It is misleading to state that in 1 Thess "all the important anthropological terms are lacking",³² as the important trichotomy *pneuma*, *psychē* and body does occur. In a later letter, 1 Cor, Paul shows that he is able to expand on it when he distinguishes between different classes of human beings, those who have a *pneuma*, the *pneumatikoi*, and those who have not, the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2,13-3,1).

It is far more natural then, to interpret the triad of spirit, soul and body in Paul's first letter in the technical, Hellenized sense in which it was also used by Philo. Likewise, against the background of Philo, the descending hierarchical order of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body is not haphazard either, but implies that the restored and purified spirit-mind influences the rest of humankind's soul and its body.

In Philo, the purification of the mind is an important motif. We have already seen that the mind which has been rendered pure by perfect virtue, in its turn, purifies the lower soul of the senses and the body (*On Dreams* 1,177). To phrase it differently,

³⁰ FESTUGIÈRE, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (n. 16), Excursus B, pp. 196-220.

³¹ SCHNELLE, *The Human Condition* (n. 28), p. 41.

³² SCHNELLE, *The Human Condition* (n. 28), p. 44.

...the wholly purified mind (...) disregards not only the body, but that other section of the soul which is devoid of reason and steeped in blood, aflame with seething passions and burning lusts (*Who Is the Heir* 64).

As a consequence, "the purified mind (ὁ κεκαθαρμένος νοῦς) of the wise man preserves the virtues free from breach or hurt" (*On Flight and Finding* 112).

This complex of ideas can be rightly called a soteriology, a doctrine of salvation. As a matter of fact, Philo himself stresses that the mind (*nous*) is "brought back by the mercy of its Saviour (σωτήρ)" and "honoured with the gift of quietude by God" (*On Rewards and Punishments* 117.121).

Only then, when the mind has been granted quietude, can there be an end to "the cycle of unceasing war ever revolving round the many-sided soul", the strife between body and mind (*On Dreams* 2,14). That war "the mind (*nous*) is wont to leave, when, filled with the divine, it finds itself in the presence of the Existent Himself and contemplates the incorporeal ideas" (*On Drunkenness* 99).

It shows that the mind does not necessarily "remain for ever deceived nor stand rooted in the realm of sense" (*On Abraham* 88), but that it can be "mastered by the love of the divine" (*On Dreams* 2,232). Those who turn back to God have the image of God in them restored. They are those "who do not deface with base practices the coin within them which bears the stamp of God, even the sacred mind (*nous*)" (*The Unchangeableness of God* 105).

3. Paul of Tarsus

There are many similarities between Philo and Paul with regard to the differentiation between the heavenly human being, who is identified with *pneuma*, and the earthly human being, who is identified with the *psychē*. Moreover, in both authors the "first human being" is the earthly Adam. Nevertheless, many scholars have assumed that there is an implicit criticism of Philonic views in Paul's statement that "the pneumatic does not come first but the psychic, and only subsequently the pneumatic" – ἀλλ' οὐ πρῶτον τὸ πνευματικὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ ψυχικόν, ἔπειτα τὸ πνευματικόν (1 Cor 15,46).³³

³³ Cf. SCHALLER, *Adam und Christus bei Paulus* (n. 9), pp. 149-151, already referred to above.

However, as we have seen above, for Philo too the term “first human being” (*ho prōtos anthrōpos*) refers to the earthly Adam. This being the case, the chances are slim that the phrase “the pneumatic does not come first” entails a criticism of Philonic views on this matter. It is important to note that the discussion in 1 Cor 15 is not about the psychic (*to psychikon*) and the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*) in general, but about the psychic and pneumatic *body*. What is at issue is the *sōma psychikon* and the *sōma pneumatikon*. In Paul’s view, it is not that the pneumatic reality (*to pneumatikon*) as such belongs to the future, but rather that the pneumatic *body* only becomes a reality after the eschatological resurrection. Paul’s reflections have wrongly been taken to mean that, in opposition to Philonic ideas, the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*) is only a future reality. This cannot be true, since the pneumatic (*to pneumatikon*) already occurs in the present, as Paul makes clear in a different polemical setting in 1 Cor 1–4. In this section of 1 Cor Paul already reckons with the existence of the *pneumatikoi*, those who are characterized by *pneuma* (1 Cor 2,13.15; 3,1; cf. Gal 6,1). This is Paul’s designation of true, mature human beings, as opposed to the *psychikoi* (1 Cor 2,14) and *nēpioi* (the children; 1 Cor 3,14). This is reminiscent of the passage from Philo discussed in section 2.2 above, in which Philo, on the basis of his tripartite division of humankind, calls the mind (*nous*) “the perfect human being” and contrasts it with the bad human being and the child, who need commandments and instruction:

There is no need, then, to give injunctions or prohibitions or exhortations to the perfect man formed after the (divine) image (τῷ τελείῳ τῷ κατ’ εἰκόνα), for none of these does the perfect man (*ho teleios*) require. The bad man has need of injunction and prohibition, and the child (*tōi nēpiōi*) of exhortation and teaching (*Allegorical Interpretation* 1,94).

As in Philo, in Paul, too, those who have had their *nous* or *pneuma* restored, the *pneumatikoi*, are a present type of human beings, not a future one. In response to this view on the restoration of humankind’s *pneuma*, however, one could object that according to Paul there is no question of the *restoration* of humankind’s *pneuma*: in 1 Cor 15, the passage from Gen 2,7 is applied in such a way that, whereas the first Adam possesses only a *psychē*, the last Adam will be granted a *pneuma*: οὕτως καὶ γέγραπται· ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν (Gen 2,7 LXX: καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν), ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν – “It is in this sense that Scripture says: ‘The first human being, Adam, became a living soul’, whereas the last

Adam has become a life-giving spirit" (1 Cor 15,45). If the passage is read this way, humankind's *pneuma* is not *restored*, but rather *pneuma* is bestowed for the first time in human existence. Whereas the first human being possessed *psychē*, only the second human being will possess *pneuma*.

This, however, cannot be true. It would imply that whereas the original anthropology was dipartite, consisting of *psychē* and body, only future anthropology will become tripartite, consisting of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body. This, in turn, would imply that humankind was created as an incomplete human being. Although the context in 1 Cor 15 is indeed a debate about the future – or, more specifically about the future, post-resurrection constitution of the body – the underlying logic must be that, as a consequence of the birth and apparition of Christ, the second and last human being from heaven, humankind's *pneuma* is restored to human beings, not granted for the first time. Although theoretically the first human being had a tripartite structure, effectively humankind failed to keep its *pneuma*, so that it needs to be restored. That humankind as such does possess *pneuma* is confirmed by Paul in 1 Cor 2,11 where, in a generalizing way, he speaks about humankind's *pneuma*: τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ – "Who knows what a human being is but the human spirit (*pneuma*) within him? In the same way, only the spirit (*pneuma*) of God knows what God is".³⁴ In this generalizing passage, Paul reveals his view about the standard composition of humankind in general, a constitution which also encompasses *pneuma*. Naturally, in Paul's view, whereas, technically speaking, every human being has *pneuma*, only the Christians can have their *pneuma* really and effectively restored.

The same ambiguity is found in Plutarch when, in *On the Sign of Socrates*, he reflects on the three kinds of human beings. Although Plutarch emphasizes that "every soul (*psychē*) partakes of mind (*nous*); none is irrational or without mind (*a-nous*)" (591D: ψυχὴ πᾶσα νοῦ μετέσχευ, ἄλογος δὲ καὶ ἄνους οὐκ ἔστιν), he nevertheless goes on to state that the lowest class of human beings sinks entirely into the body (αἱ <μὲν> ὅλαι κατέδυσαν εἰς σῶμα), as if into the depths of the terrible, deep, water-filled abyss of the Styx. Unlike the intermediate class, whose *nous* "is not dragged in with the rest, but is like a buoy attached to the top, floating on the surface in contact with the man's head, while

³⁴ I owe this observation to Dr Edward Adams, London.

he is as it were submerged in the depths" (591E), the lowest class seems, in the words of John Dillon, "to have souls that are completely immersed in the body, *in such a way as to leave no 'nous' floating as a 'buoy' above them*".³⁵ As Dillon asks: "Does this mean that they have effectively no *nous*?" Indeed, he answers, "they have no *nous* remaining above".³⁶ In this way a picture emerges of "souls breaking loose on their own, quite devoid of intellect"; "some souls are left wholly devoid of *nous*".³⁷

Plutarch thus shows the same ambiguity as Paul: although, strictly speaking, all souls possess *nous*,³⁸ effectively some have none. To put it in Paul's terminology: although originally humankind was created with a trichotomous identity of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body, effectively, after the degeneration and fall of humankind, human beings had no *pneuma* till it was restored to them by means of their unification with Christ, the second human being from heaven. It is from this perspective of restoration that Paul quotes Gen 2,7 in 1 Cor 15,45: "It is in this sense that Scripture says: 'The first human being, Adam, became a living *psychē*', whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving *pneuma*". Paul does not mean that humankind was originally created as a dichotomic being, consisting only of *psychē* and body, but rather that, though humankind was created as a trichotomic being, made up of *pneuma*, *psychē* and body, it is only Christ who restores the *pneuma* which had effectively become lost. In his quotation of Gen 2,7, Paul forgets about the brief period in which, between his creation and almost instantaneous fall, humankind did effectively possess *pneuma*. Rather he attributes the bestowal of *pneuma* to its definitive endowment by Christ as an act of recreation (cf. 2 Cor 5,14-17). This gift of *pneuma* is a fruit of realized eschatology. The restoration of humankind's *pneuma* is a result of the eschatological gift of the Spirit which is already operative (e.g. 1 Thess 4,8; 2 Cor 1,22; 5,5; Rom 5,5; 8,15.23). In the context of 1 Cor 15, however, Paul stresses that, although already at work, the Spirit is not yet fully effective. Only at the end of time will the Spirit also transform the psychic body into a pneumatic body (1 Cor 15,44-49).

³⁵ DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), p. 39 (italics mine).

³⁶ DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), p.40.

³⁷ DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), pp. 42-43.

³⁸ Cf. Ph.H. DE LACY – B. EINARSON, *Plutarch's Moralia*, vol. 7 (Loeb Classical Library), Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press – London, Heinemann, 1959, p. 473 note a: "All souls, strictly speaking, possess understanding" (*nous*).

4. Concluding observations

Philo's and Paul's anthropology of tripartite human beings is very similar. Inasmuch as they call the highest part of humankind not only *nous* but, on account of their exegesis of Gen 2,7, preferably *pneuma*, one might also suggest that they stressed the identical, pneumatic nature of God and humankind in a far more egalitarian and accessible way than is the case in the Greek equivalent anthropology. In order to experience fellowship with God, humankind did not have to improve the intellectual abilities of his *nous* but felt connected through the *pneuma*. In Plutarch, as John Dillon explains, the highest class of people, who possess *nous*, is rather restricted: "Intellect [*nous*] thus becomes something rather special, not readily accessible to the mass of humankind".³⁹ Both Philo and Paul make transition from *nous* to *pneuma*, although, as we saw in section 2.3, Philo's soteriology still remains somewhat elitist, in line with its ancient philosophical counterparts. According to Festugière: "Du νοῦς au πνεῦμα, voilà toute la différence, ce qui (...) distingue spécifiquement le christianisme".⁴⁰ More than in pagan philosophy, participation in God himself is open to all:

Notre âme est déjà son πνεῦμα. Tout naturellement, dès lors, elle devient siège de la grâce, ἡ χάρις μετὰ τοῦ πνεύματος ὑμῶν, – ainsi s'achèvent les lettres aux Galates, VI, 18, aux Philippiens IV, 23, à Philémon 25, – habitacle de l'ἅγιον πνεῦμα, du saint-Esprit. (...) Ainsi, grâce à Paul, grâce au christianisme, ce qu'il y eut de meilleur dans l'âme païenne trouve enfin son vrai sens. (...) L'intelligence devient esprit.⁴¹

The free accessibility of this pneumatic identity is an aspect of Paul's "Adam Christology", as James Dunn calls it.⁴² By participating in Christ's death and resurrection in baptism (Rom 6,3-11), the human identity starts to fuse with that of Christ, the second Adam, the second human being who, in contrast to the first human being, is from heaven. Whereas humankind still bears the image of the first, earthly Adam (1 Cor 15,49), Christians increasingly bear the image of the heavenly human being and are increasingly transformed into his likeness (2 Cor 3,18). In this way their *pneuma* is restored and they turn again into trichotomous human

³⁹ DILLON, *Plutarch and the Separable Intellect* (n. 6), p. 44.

⁴⁰ FESTUGIÈRE, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (n. 16), p. 217.

⁴¹ FESTUGIÈRE, *L'idéal religieux des grecs et l'évangile* (n. 16), pp. 219-20.

⁴² See J.D.G. DUNN, *The Theology of Paul the Apostle*, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998, chaps. 4, 8.6, 10.2. The principle passages containing Adam Christology are Rom 5,12-6,11; 1 Cor 15,20-28; 1 Cor 15,45-49.

beings, the *pneumatikoi*. For this reason they can boldly claim to possess the *nous* of Christ (1 Cor 2,15-16), the *nous* of the heavenly, archetypal human being. Whereas in Plutarch the highest class of human beings, who possess *nous*, is sparsely populated, this possession is within reach for all Christians. The more they share in the *pneuma* and *nous*, the more their outer human being decreases and their inner human being, the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος, develops. This is pointed out in 2 Cor and in Romans, which are not part of the present article. Nevertheless, Paul's use of the Platonic notion of the inner human being, applied in 2 Cor 4,16 and Rom 7,22,⁴³ further underlines what we have already found, that Paul's anthropology is truly addressed to the Graeco-Roman world. Here, in Paul's anthropology, more than anywhere else, Nietzsche's description of Christianity as "Platonismus fürs Volk" is fully justified.⁴⁴

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
⁴³ Th.K. HECKEL, *Der Innere Mensch. Die paulinische Verarbeitung eines platonischen Motivs* (WUNT, 2.53), Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 1993; C. MARKSCHIES, *Innerer Mensch*, in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 18 (1997) pp. 266-312; W. BURKERT, *Towards Plato and Paul: The "Inner" Human Being*, in A.Y. COLLINS (ed.), *Ancient and Modern Perspectives on the Bible and Culture. Essays in Honor of Hans Dieter Betz*, Atlanta, GA, Scholars Press, 1998, pp. 59-82; H.D. BETZ, *The Concept of the "Inner Human Being" (ὁ ἔσω ἄνθρωπος) in the Anthropology of Paul*, in *NTS* 46.3 (2000) 315-341; VAN KOOTEN, *Paul's Anthropology in Context* (n. 1), chap. 7.2, pp. 357-392.

⁴⁴ See his *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* (1885).

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